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INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE 
  
 
Disquiet on the Home Front: 
'LVWXUELQJ&ULVHVLQWKH1DWLRQ·V
Markets and Institutions 
 
Shelby D. Green 
 
Crises are everywhere³in the housing market, in the 
financial markets and in the courts.  It is difficult to exaggerate 
how large these crises are.  It began with housing, but the 
effects dominoed throughout the economy.  Consumer wealth 
evaporated.  Developers watched rents fall and financing costs 
rise.  Businesses contracted or dissolved.  Exports plunged.  
Indeed, the Director of National Intelligence recently declared 
that the greatest threat to our national security is economic 
instability.1  The main line of defense against recession³the 
Federal Reserve³seems to be at wits end.2  All the usual 
responses have been tried and have failed: the federal interest 
rate has been cut to nearly zero and billions of dollars in loans 
continue to be pumped into the economy.3  Even the drastic 
 
    Associate Professor of Law and Director, LL.M. Program in Real Estate 
Law, Pace University School of Law.  J.D., Georgetown University Law 
Center, B.S., Towson State College.  This Article will introduce the topics 
discussed in this edition of the PACE LAW REVIEW from the symposium, Real 
Property, Mortgages, and the Economy: A Call for Ethics and Reforms, 
presented jointly by the PACE LAW REVIEW and the Pace University School of 
Law, L.L.M. Program in Real Estate Law. 
1. Stephen Manning, Experts: Financial Crisis Threatens U.S. Security, 
ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=7056044. 
2. See Louis Uchitelle, Wall Street Questioning if Bernanke is Tough 
Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at C1. 
3. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Address at the Women in 
Housing and Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: Financial 
Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008). 
1
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bailout plan,4 involving the appropriation of $700 billion to buy 
troubled assets or preferred stock in troubled banks, has not 
sparked the economy.  While almost too much has been written 
DERXW RXU QDWLRQ·V FXUUHQW HFRQRPLF ZRes, some recurring 
themes have emerged. 
 
I.  Crisis in the Housing Markets 
 
A long-­standing and laudable national goal has been to 
increase home ownership in the United States to its maximum 
possible level, which should thus lead to an accumulation of 
wealth and security throughout the nation.5  This goal has 
served as the outward premise for various national programs 
and policies.6  In fact, in 2003, home ownership reached a 
historic peak of just under seventy percent of all households.7  
This was a significant increase over the forty-­four percent rate 
in 1934, when the first federal program was established to 
realize this goal.8  Some critics, however, have asserted that 
 
4. See infra notes 109-­13 and accompanying text. 
5. See Paul Krugman, Home Not-­So-­Sweet Home, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
2008, at A21. 
6. The list of these national programs is indeed extensive, however 
particularly prominent features include the deductibility from taxable income 
of mortgage interest, see 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(i) (2006), and the creation of 
WKH)HGHUDO+RXVLQJ$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ´)+$µWRSURYLGHLQVXUDQFHWROHQGHUV
and to permit leveraging of ninety-­seven percent on FHA loans, see 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1709(b)(9)(A) (2006) (requiring homeowners to make a 3.5% down 
payment).  See also The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-­128, § 801, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.);; OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP·T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., U.S. HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS: 3D QUARTER 1 (2006), available at 
www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/fall06/Q306_summary.pdf;; Vernon L. 
Smith, The Clinton Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A20 
(mocking various governmental policies, including reduced capital gains tax 
rate, funding mortgages by federally-­chartered agencies, and short-­sighted 
federal reserve policies as causing the housing bubble now exploding);; infra 
note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the implicit Federal Government 
guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
7. See Dean Baker, Subprime Borrowers Deserve an Own to Rent 
Transition, ECONOMISTS· VOICE, Feb. 2008, at 2, available at 
KWWSZZZEHSUHVVFRPHYYROLVVDUW IROORZ ´'RZQORDGµ  See also 
OFFICE OF FED. HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT ´2)+(2µ REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 5 (2008), available at 
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf. 
8. See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census of Housing Tables, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html (last 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/13
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these national policies, particularly the deductibility of 
mortgage interest and government insurance of mortgage 
loans, have distorted the markets and subsidized risk-­taking 
by encouraging borrowers to increase their mortgage leverage 
and lenders to decrease their caution.9  The immediate result 
was a rising housing market.10  ´From 1995 to 2006, house 
prices rose by almost eighty percent after adjusting for 
LQIODWLRQµ11 compared to the century from 1895 to 1995, when 
house prices rose at almost the same rate as inflation.12  The 
bubble-­inflated prices of recent years facilitated a level of 
construction that was far greater than what the ranks of 
 
visited Oct. 28, 2009);; infra notes 128-­33 and accompanying text. 
9. See Posting of Edward L. Glaeser, Killing (or Maiming) a Sacred Cow: 
Home Mortgage Deductions, Economix, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/killing-­or-­maiming-­a-­sacred-­
cow-­home-­mortgage-­deductions/ (Feb. 24, 2009, 07:40 EST).  See also Steven 
A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 1999, at C2.  Lenders used the national goal of homeownership 
cynically, or perhaps in an act of self-­deception, as they relied heedlessly on 
models instead of the actual circumstances of the borrower and the world in 
lending.  NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 268-­69 (2008).  The model 
allowed them to relax underwriting standards (including foregoing 
documentation of assets and income, as well as high leveraging) partly 
because of the real property collateral and the recognition that low-­income 
borrowers often had undocumented income.  Id. at 269.  Lenders could 
minimize the increased risks by raising interest rates and shifting the risk of 
inflation through adjustable rate mortgages.  Id. at 264-­65.  Most 
significantly, lenders could pass on most of the risks through a sale of the 
mortgages in pools on the secondary market.  Id. at 268-­69.  The secondary 
mortgage market is a market where existing mortgages are bought and sold.  
See Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage 
Market and Mortgage Finance, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 
(PART I) 31, 31-­45 (2008).  At first, two privately owned, yet government-­
sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued debt and used the 
proceeds to purchase mortgages in the secondary market.  See generally 
Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market: A Catalyst For Change 
in Real Estate Transactions, 39 S.W. L.J. 991 (1986).  In recent years, private 
investment entities have also entered the secondary market.  See SHARON L. 
STARK & BARBARA F. BUCKLEY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY 
MARKET MONITOR 6 (July 2008), available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131013.pdf. 
10. See Glaeser, supra note 9. 
11. Baker, supra note 7, at 1.  Indeed, in 2001, the average price of a 
home exceeded all the highest prices.  See OFHEO, supra note 7, at 3.  In 
2006, the average price was nearly twice the average price less than ten 
years earlier.  See id. at 5. 
12. Baker, supra note 7, at 1. 
3
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prospective home-­buyers could absorb.13 
High leveraging by poor credit risks in real estate markets, 
however, promoted instability in both the housing and financial 
markets.14  These highly-­leveraged homeowners could not 
 
13. See David Brooks, The Bailout Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at 
A23. 
14. These highly-­leveraged borrowers make up in large measure what is 
UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH ´VXESULPH PDUNHWµ  ,W LV SULPDULO\ FKDUDFWHUL]HG DV
consisting of borrowers with relatively low credit scores (620 compared to the 
medium score in the country of 723).  Characteristics of Subprime Lending 
Market Generally, Subprime Lending: An Update of the Issues and 
Approaches (MB) § 2, at 3-­4 (2007).  These borrowers also borrow on a loan-­
to-­value ratio greater than eighty percent.  Id.  As such, they posed the 
greatest risk, with their great prospect of being unable to carry their debt.  To 
minimize some of this risk, these loans involve a balloon payment of 
principal, and are often coupled with negative amortization that adds accrued 
but unpaid interest to the debt.  This means that the principal is not being 
reduced on a regular basis.  These borrowers are enticed into these loans by 
the promise of the possibility of repayment on sale or refinancing at a higher 
price.  The most common type of subprime mortgage, the so-­called 2/28 loans, 
start out at below-­PDUNHW ´WHDVHUµ UDWHs fixed for two years, and are then 
adjusted in accordance with some index for the remaining twenty-­eight year 
term.  Once the teaser period expired, many borrowers were unable to carry 
the adjustable interest payments when overall interest rate levels did not 
remain low.  With the decline in housing prices, these borrowers were unable 
to refinance their unwise loans.  There is approximately $1.3 trillion of 
subprime mortgage debt outstanding, and approximately twenty percent of 
current, outstanding home mortgages are subprime.  See Amy Crews Cutts, 
Deputy Chief Economist, Freddie Mac, Address at the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, 2008 Document Custody Conference (Sept. 22, 2008), available 
at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2008/DocumentManageme
ntandCustodyConf08/DMC08SEPT25AmyCuttsMarketUpdate.pdf.  The 
great bulk of the subprime loans were borrowed in 2005 and 2006, at the 
height of the housing boom.  Id.  Almost two-­thirds of these loans have been 
packaged into mortgage-­backed securities.  See ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL 
SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORTS: UNDERSTANDING 
THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf.  The related Alt-­
$ PDUNHW LV DOVR VXIIHULQJ  7KH ´$OW-­$µ PRUWJDJH PDUNHW LV PDGH XS RI
borrowers who may be self-­employed, with a reasonable credit standing, but 
who have unsteady income.  Finance and Economics: Move Over, Subprime;; 
Mortgage Losses, ECONOMIST (London), Feb. 7, 2009, at 63, 63.  The same lax 
lending practices that characterized the subprime market, applied equally to 
the Alt-­A market: scant documentation and risky, negative-­amortization 
PRUWJDJHV  ´$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH %DQN IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6HWWOHPHQWV D
staggering 40% of American mortgages originated in the first quarter of 2007 
were interest-­only or negative-­DPRUWL]DWLRQ ORDQVµ  Id.  As the risks were 
JUHDW´>G@HOLQTXHQFLHVURFNHWHGLQWKHILQDOPRQWKVRIµId.  The sharp 
drop in house prices has sent half of all Alt-­A borrowers into negative equity.  
Id.  0RRG\·V´TXDGUXSOHGLWVORVVSURMHFWLRQVRQERQGVEDFNHGE\VXFKORDQV
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/13
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normalize their borrowing status through refinancing because 
their property lacked equity, and thus they defaulted.  These 
defaults prompted a tsunami: defaults in the investment-­grade 
mortgage-­EDFNHGVHFXULWLHV´0%6µ)15 and AAA-­rated securities 
were downgraded;; investors became jittery;; the price of debt 
securities began to fall;; firms had to mark them to market16 
and put up more cash by selling more securities;; market prices 
plunged;; banks and other financial institutions wrote down the 
value of their MBS;; and market prices fell below the intrinsic 
value of the underlying assets.17 
There continues to be a debate as to whether the brisk 
pace of the subprime market caused the collapse of the housing 
market, or whether the decline in housing prices was a normal 
cycle in the movement of the market in general.18  Regardless, 
it is undeniable that the multitude of highly-­leveraged 
borrowers is an essential factor in the chain of events that have 
roiled both the national and international economies of late.19 
As the housing market has cooled and as housing prices 
have fallen, the national and international effects are stark 
and multifarious.  In some areas, the fall has been precipitous.  
For instance, in Detroit, Las Vegas, and Miami, prices have 
dropped at double-­digit annual rates.20  Those in economic 
 
of the $59 billion of AAA-­rated securities that 0RRG\·VFXWEHWZHHQ-DQXDU\
WKDQG)HEUXDU\QGZHQWVWUDLJKWWRMXQNµId. 
15. Mortgage-­EDFNHG VHFXULWLHV DUH LQVWUXPHQWV EDVHG XSRQ ´SRROVµ RI
mortgages.  See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mortgage-­Backed 
Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2009). 
16. 7R´PDUNWRPDUNHWµPHDQVWRZULWHGRZQWKHYDOXHIRUDQDVVHWWR
reflect the prevailing market price.  See S.E.C. Elects to Keep Mark-­to-­Market 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B2. 
17. Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-­2008: A Discussion of the 
Background, Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF ST. LOUIS REV. (PART I) 531, 533 (2008). 
18. Id. at 531-­33. 
19. See The Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th 
Cong. 26-­30 (2008) (statement of Robert F. Wescott, President, Keybridge 
Research LLC), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081010150253.pdf (unofficial 
transcript). 
20. From August 2007 through August 2008, housing  prices declined by 
twenty-­eight percent in Miami, seventeen percent in Detroit, and thirty-­one 
percent in Las Vegas.  See SHARON L. STARK & BARBARA F. BUCKLEY, OFFICE 
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 5 (Oct. 2008), available 
5
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distress and who have mortgages under water have been forced 
to sell their homes at substantial losses, or else risk 
foreclosure.21  Moreover, the estimated number of foreclosures 
is expected to range wildly, from four to five million, through 
2010, absent drastic intervention.22  Borrowers and lenders 
could voluntarily work out a compromise, but subprime 
mortgage holders often insist on foreclosure.23  As of the fourth 
 
at http://files.ots.treas.gov/131015.pdf. 
21. The percentage of sales attributable to foreclosure rose sharply 
between July 2007 and July 2008.  See TOM DAY, ZHONG YI TONG & DAVE 
MALMQUIST, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 7 
(Nov. 2008) [hereinafter DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008], available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131016.pdf.  In Miami, the foreclosure rate was 
fourteen percent, in Phoenix it was thirty-­three percent, and in Los Angeles it 
was thirty-­four percent.  Id.  In 2008, a record 1.6 million homeowners lost 
their homes to foreclosure.  Priorities for the Next Administration: Use of 
TARP Funds Under EESA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 
111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Priorities] (statement of John F. Bovenzi, 
Deputy to the Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Federal Deposit 
,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)',&µ available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/bovenzi011309.pdf.  
In 2009 and 2010, an estimated five million more homeowners will lose their 
homes.  Id.  ´$V RI WKH WKLUG TXDUWHU RI  DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI
outstanding subprime mortgages [were] in default, and almost 7% [were] in 
foreclosure³UDWHV IDU KLJKHU WKDQ IRU SULPH KRPH PRUWJDJHVµ  3KLOLS 5
White & James M. Hirschhorn, :KDWWKH´6XESULPH&ULVLVµ5HDOO\0HDQVIRU
Your Business, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2008, at 20, available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/January/20.pdf.  In September 
2008, these figures had risen: approximately 24% of mortgages were in 
default and 11.5% in foreclosure.  TOM DAY, ZHONG YI TONG & DAVE 
MALMQUIST, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 11 
(Dec. 2008), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/1310171.pdf.  In November 
2008, the percentage of seriously delinquent subprime mortgages rose to 
42.5%.  SHARON STARK, ZHONG YI TONG & JONATHAN JONES, OFFICE OF THRIFT 
SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 8 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131018.pdf. 
22. See Oversight of Implementation of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 and Efforts to Mitigate Foreclosures: Hearing on the 
Housing Crisis Before the Subcomm. on Financial Serv. and the General 
Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(statement of Michael Krimminger, Special Advisor for Policy, Office of the 
Chairman, FDIC), available at http://appropriations.senate.gov/ht-­
financial.cfm IROORZ ´7HVWLPRQ\RI0LFKDHO.ULPPLQJHURI WKH)',&DW WKH
'HF+RXVLQJ&ULVLV+HDULQJµPriorities, supra note 21 (statement of John 
F. Bovenzi, Deputy to the Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, FDIC) 
(predicting that 4 to 5 million foreclosures will occur within the next two 
years without government intervention). 
23. See EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 9-­
10 (2008). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/13
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quarter of 2008, the rate of homeownership declined to 67.5%, 
which is 1.3% below its peak of four years earlier, and its 
lowest level since the first quarter of 2001.24  The effects of the 
crisis are felt more sharply by certain populations within our 
society.  For instance, the homeownership rate for African-­
Americans stood at 46.7% in the third quarter of 2008³3% 
below its peak level reached in the third quarter of 2004.25 
Foreclosures depress the housing market, leading to more 
foreclosures and inevitably resulting in net losses to lenders, 
 
24. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership³
Fourth Quarter 2008: Table 5, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr408/q408tab5.html (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2009).  See also 2008 OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. 
OVERSIGHT, ANNUAL REPORT 5, available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf 
UHSRUWLQJ WKDW ´>W@KH QDWLRQDO KRPHRZQHUVKLS UDWH GHFOLQHG IURP 
percent at the end of the fourth quarter of 2006 to 67.8 percent one year 
later³the lowest level since the second TXDUWHU RI µ WKH DJHQF\ KDV
since been renamed the Federal Housing Finance Agency). 
25. See Baker, supra note 7, at 2.  In fact, the evidence shows that 
African-­American and Hispanic homeowners over the age of 50 experienced 
higher rates of foreclosure than Caucasian homeowners in all age groups, and 
URXJKO\ GRXEOH WKHLU UDWH RI KRPHRZQHUVKLS  ´2OGHU $IULFDQ-­American 
homeowners held 6.8 [percent] of all first mortgages, but represented only 
14.4 percent of all foreclosures;; while Hispanic homeowners aged 50 and 
older held 7.5 percent of first mortgages, but represented 15.9 percent of all 
IRUHFORVXUHVµHelping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 
2009 and Emergency Home Ownership and Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 
200 and H.R. 225 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) 
(testimony of David M. Certner, Legal Counsel and Legislative Policy 
Director, Association for the Advancement of Retired Persons), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/certner090122.pdf. 
 
Having a subprime loan was found to be associated with 
higher foreclosure rates for all age groups, but the impact of 
subprime lending was disproportionately greater for older 
homeowners[.]  Homeowners age 50 and older . . . [were] 
nearly 17 times more likely to be in foreclosure than 
homeowners of the same age with prime loans . . . . 
 
Id.  See also Rick Brooks, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-­Worthy, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3. 2007, at A1.  Although this is hotly disputed by lenders, 
the Wall Street Journal cited allegations that some such borrowers were 
steered into subprime loans by brokers and lenders whose commission 
structures gave them an incentive to market loans bearing higher interest 
rates.  Brooks, supra.  In addition, the proportion of non-­white borrowers who 
obtained subprime loans is substantially higher than the proportion of white 
borrowers.  See Ruth Simon, Illinois Probes Mortgage Firms, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 7, 2008, at A3. 
7
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since these forced sales commonly net only fifty to sixty-­five 
SHUFHQW RI WKH SURSHUW\·V UHDO YDOXH26  Recent housing 
inventory statistics show record or near record levels of homes 
on the market.27  The current vacancy rate of 2.7 for ownership 
units is more than forty percent higher than the level reached 
in any prior housing drop.28  Excessive supply, working in 
tandem with high foreclosure rates, will accelerate the 
downward pressure on housing prices.29  It was predicted that 
home prices would continue to decline through 2009, with 
stabilization and recovery beginning in 2010.30  Added to these 
losses are increased costs to local governments that provide 
emergency shelter and social services to the newly homeless 
and neighboring owners.31 
While mortgage default rates have risen dramatically over 
the past three years across all borrower and interest rate types, 
the most dramatic increase has occurred in subprime loans.32  
The vintage of the loan was also a significant factor in loan 
performance.33  Additionally, in terms of the severity of the 
 
26. STARK, YI TONG & JONES, supra note 21, at 8.  See also Amy Crews 
Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and 
Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, at Table 8, Figures 5, 7, 
$SS·[ $ )UHGGLH 0DF :RUNLQJ 3DSHU 1R -­01), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Our_Region/Community_Development/pdf/interv
entions_in_mortgage_default_Frank.pdf. 
27. DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra note 21, at 5.  But see 
STARK, YI TONG & JONES, supra note 21, at 6 (showing a twenty-­seven percent 
decline in inventory of existing and new homes between August and 
November 2008). 
28. See Baker, supra note 7, at 2. 
29. See id. 
30. See DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra note 21, at 6.  See 
also SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI TONG, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, 
QUARTERLY MARKET MONITOR 4-­5 (May 2009), available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131020.pdf (showing an 11.5% decline in home prices 
from one year earlier, and a more than 30% decline since the peak in mid-­
2006). 
31. The cost associated to both the Federal Government and taxpayers 
in addressing this crisis nationwide is discussed throughout the Article. 
32. See Amy Crews Cutts, supra note 14 (reporting that the rate of 
default on subprime adjustable rate mortgages was 20 times higher than the 
rate of default on prime fixed rate mortgages, and that subprime loans 
accounted for over half of foreclosures begun since 2006). 
33. The year 2007 had the worst overall loan performance, as compared 
to 2006, 2005, and 2004, respectively.  See SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI 
TONG, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 8 (May 
2009), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/131020.pdf. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/13
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losses that occurred, subprime loans were the most costly.34  
It appears that the effect of pushing so many moderate 
income families into homeownership on any terms in the 
bubble-­inflated market of the last few years was a cruel play, a 
set-­XS WR IRUHFORVXUH DQG WKH ORVV RI PDQ\ IDPLOLHV· KRPHV
:KDWZDVRQFHWKRXJKWWREHWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKH´$PHULFDQ
drHDPµ LV QRZ D QLJKWPDUH³´not an obvious route . . . [to] 
ZHDOWKµ35  Indeed, the statistics reveal that it was all just 
about the money, the profits from high-­rate loans, and nothing 
more.36 
 
II. Crisis in the Financial Markets 
 
In a single month in 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average lost 1,514 points, reflecting price movements ranging 
between 2,937 points.37  In that same month, the Chicago 
%RDUG 2SWLRQV ([FKDQJH 9RODWLOLW\ ,QGH[ ´9,;µ UHDFKHG DQ
 
34. As of November 2008, subprime loans sustained 62.3 cents on the 
dollar, followed by option ARMs at 52.3 cents, Alt-­As at 51.2 cents, and jumbo 
loans at 37.2 cents.  Id. at 7-­8.  In regards to vintage, 2007 subprime loans 
sustained the highest, relative to 2006, 2005, and 2004 respectively.  Id. at 7. 
35. Baker, supra note 7, at 2. 
36. Yet swift ride of the loan originators has also come to an abrupt halt.  
Several of the top loan companies have suffered massive losses.  Countrywide 
Financial lost $893 million in the first quarter of 2008, the third consecutive 
TXDUWHUO\ORVVIRUWKHQDWLRQ·VODUJHVWPRUWJDJHOHQGHUDQGORDQVHUYLFHUSee 
Countrywide Says it Lost $893 Million in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, 
DW&7KLVZDVDGUDVWLFGHFUHDVHLQFRPSDULVRQWR&RXQWU\ZLGH·VHDUQLQJV
of $434 million just a year earlier.  Id.  ,Q&RXQWU\ZLGHKDG´FKDUJH-­
RIIVµ RU ORDQV ZULWWHQ RII DV QRW UHSDLG ZKLFK WRWDOHG  PLOOLRQ DV
opposed to $39 million in 2007.  Id.  In addition, delinquencies in 
&RXQWU\ZLGH·VVHUYLFLQJSRUWIROLRGRXEOHGLQXSWRSHUFHQWIURP
percent in 2007.  Id.  All the while, loan applications continued to rise by 
more than 27 percent, totaling $2.2 billion.  Id.  On January 4, 2009, 
Countrywide agreed to be purchased by Bank of America at a price of $4 
billion.  See Gretchen Morgenson, &RXQWU\ZLGH·V%X\HU ,VQ·W%OLQNLQJ, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2008, at BU1.  Additionally, early in 2008, IndyMac Bancorp 
reported sharp increases in delinquencies and foreclosures, which resulted in 
its stock price falling $1.23 per share.  Thornburg, A Mortgage Lender, Misses 
Margin Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at C3.  The number of delinquencies 
on the loans it serviced, specifically those loans at least thirty days past due, 
´URVH WR  SHUFHQW LQ -DQXDU\ IURP  SHUFHQW LQ 'HFHPEHU DQG 
SHUFHQWLQWKHILUVWTXDUWHURIµ Id.  Delinquencies among prime loans 
rose to 6.85 percent, up from 3.83 percent in 2007.  Id.  Subprime mortgage 
delinquencies rose to 28.18 percent, up from 18.55 percent a year earlier.  Id. 
37. See DAY, YI TONG & MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra note 21, at 1. 
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all-­time high of 80.1%.38  The year 2008 can also be 
remembered for the collapse and disappearance of venerable 
banks and financial institutions: Bear Stearns (bought out by 
J.P. Morgan Chase),39 Merrill Lynch (bought by Bank of 
America),40 Lehman Brothers (filed for bankruptcy),41 
Wachovia Bank (bought by Wells Fargo)42 and Countrywide 
FLQDQFLDO WKH FRXQWU\·V ODUJHVW ORDQ RULJLQDWRU ERXJKW E\
Bank of America).43  The Federal Deposit Insurance 
&RUSRUDWLRQ ´)',&µ WRRN RYHU PDQ\ EDQNV WKDW KDG RYHU-­
extended themselves, such as IndyMac44 and Washington 
Mutual.45  These institutions had amassed so much debt that 
threatened to overwhelm them.  That debt was largely from 
investments in the secondary market³that is, they bought and 
sold mortgage-­backed securities.46 
 
38. See STARK, YI TONG & JONES, supra note 21, at 4.  The VIX is 
VRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH´IHDULQGH[µDOWKRXJKLWPHDVXUHVYRODWLOLW\LQ
either direction.  Id.  Another indication of turmoil in the market is changes 
in the LIBOR rate.  See id.  For example, the LIBOR rate rose from 2.15 
percent on September 12, 2008, to 6.44 percent on September 16, 2008.  See 
%ULWLVK%DQNHUV· $VVRFLDWLRQ+LVWRULF /,%255DWHV 6HSW    
(on file with the %ULWLVK%DQNHUV·$VVRFLDWLRQDQGDXWKRU 
39. See Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Rescues Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 17, 2008, at A1. 
40. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
41. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape 
Landscape of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
42. See Dan Fitzpatrick, Wells Fargo Grabs Wachovia as Citi Walks, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at C1. 
43. See Morgenson, supra note 36.  In addition, the American 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO*URXS´$,*µZDVRQWKHEULQNRIFROODSVHXQWLOUHVFXHGE\WKH
Department of Treasury. 
44. See Louise Story, Regulators Seize IndyMac After a Run on the Bank, 
N.Y. TIMES, July. 12, 2008, at C1. 
45. See Eric Dash & Andre Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S. 
Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.  In the FDIC Quarterly 
%DQNLQJ 3URILOH 5HSRUW LQ WKH WKLUG TXDUWHU RI  ´H[SHQVHV IRU FUHGLW
losses topped $50 billion for a second consecutive quarter. . . . [T]hird quarter 
net income totaled $1.7 billion, a decline of $27.0 billion (94.0 percent) from 
the third quarter of 2007. . . . [A]lmost one in every four institutions (24.1 
SHUFHQW UHSRUWHG D QHW ORVV IRU WKH TXDUWHU    µ   FDIC QUARTERLY 
BANKING PROFILE 1, at 1 (2008). 
46. Securitization is the transformation of groups of similar kinds of 
receivables (credit card debt, leases, and mortgages, for instance) into 
securities that can then be sold to investors.  For example, commercial loans 
can be converted into collateralL]HGGHEWREOLJDWLRQV ´&'2VµZKLFKHQWLWOH
the investors to receive specific cash flows generated by the loans.  The pool 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/13
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Mortgage-­backed securities based on pools of mortgages 
have been safely sold since the conversion of Fannie Mae into a 
government-­chartered private corporation and the creation of 
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.47  But, more recently, these 
securities became unduly risky when they became based on 
subprime mortgages.48  In the past decade, market participants 
LJQRUHG WKHVH ULVNV DV WKH\ ´GLVFRYHUHG WKDW FDVK IORZV IURP
pools of mortgages could be structured so that one class of 
investors bore a minimal risk of default while others bore 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ JUHDWHU ULVNµ49  Because of this division of risk, 
´LQYHVWPHQW JUDGH VHFXULWLHV FRXOG EH FUHDWHGµ DOPRVW
PDJLFDOO\ ´WR ILQDQFH PRUWJDJHV IRU SHRSOH ZKR SUHYLRXVO\
ZHUHQRWFUHGLWZRUWK\µ50  Issuers of these securities promised a 
reduced risk from default on the underlying subprime 
mortgages by keeping: 
 
[A] margin between the amount of mortgages 
held by the pool and the amount of [securities] 
issued, by [setting] an interest rate spread 
between the mortgages and the [securities], and 
by various guarantees, insurance and hedging 
techniques.  The remaining risk of default was 
allocated among different payment tranches, so 
that [the lowest price securities] would be 
exposed to the earliest defaults while the most 
secure would have priority over whatever 
payment came in.  The most secure tranches 
were rated investment grade by the credit rating 
agencies, which made them eligible for purchase 
 
of mortgages underlying the security is often divided up into tranches, 
assigning various amounts of risks and returns, and making them suitable 
for a variety of different investors.  The issuance of these securities provided 
liquidity to many different markets and spread the risk among the issuers 
and investors, as well as the borrowers on the other side.  Issuers of the 
securities usually did this through special purpose entities or structured 
investment vehicles, whereby the underlying assets and their liabilities were 
reflected on different sets of books. 
47. Lawrence J. White, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Finance: 
Why True Privatization is Good Public Policy, 528 CATO INST. POLICY 
ANALYSIS 1, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa528.pdf. 
48. White & Hirschhorn, supra note 21, at 20. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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by insurance companies and ERISA regulated 
pension funds.  The less secure received 
speculative grade ratings and many were 
purchased and pooled as the basis for so-­called 
collateralized debt obligations.51 
 
All of the struggling institutions mentioned above52 seemed 
to have been afflicted with the same malady: under-­pricing of 
risk.53  Perhaps this was due to the novelty of these securities.54  
But some economists say that mispricing risk occurs during 
both boom times and crashes, when rational thinking is 
overcome by greed and fear.55  In a boom, over-­confident 
investors take on bets that they later find themselves unable to 
discharge.  In this crisis, the players made one-­way bets³that 
the markets would only go up.  They did not anticipate the 
´black swansµRUWKH´dragons.µ56 
In 1983, Ben Bernanke offered an analysis of the causes 
and effects of the Great Depression.57  The current Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve then commented on the causality between 
adverse developments in the macroeconomy (or, declines in 
aggregate output) and bank failures, with respect to their 
coincidences and to the persistence of the relevant financial 
 
51. Id.  CDOs are defined as mechanisms for converting mortgage 
securities and corporate bonds from large, illiquid assets into liquid financial 
instruments.  See FDIC, Enhancing Transparency in the Structured Finance 
Market, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2008, at 5-­9, 13;; Mizen, supra note 
17, at 538.  They are structured financial products, usually backed by pools of 
mortgages, and typically sliced into tranches with varying degrees of risk and 
projected returns.  See FDIC, supra, at 5;; Mizen, supra note 17, at 538. 
52. See supra notes 39-­45 and accompanying text. 
53. See generally Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Jan. 4, 2009, at 24. 
54. See White & Hirschhorn, supra note 21, at 20. 
55. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 36-­39 (5th ed. 2005). 
56. These unusual references stand for the unknown variables in risk 
calculations that take place more frequently than we are willing to 
FRQWHPSODWH´%HFDXVHZHGRQ·WNQRZZKDWDEODFNVZDQPLJKWORRNOLNHRU
ZKHQLWPLJKWDSSHDUDQGWKHUHIRUHGRQ·WSODQIRU it, it will always get us in 
WKHHQGµ1RFHUDsupra note 53, at 29.  6HHDOVR,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, ECONOMIST 
(SPECIAL REPORT) (London), Jan. 24, 2009, at 12, 14. 
57. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 258-­63 (1983). 
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crisis.58  There were arguments on both sides of this causality 
issue.  One view was that the problems of the financial system 
had tended to lead to output declines;; in fact, sources of 
financial panics unconnected with the fall in output have been 
documented by many writers.59  The other view was that 
industrial production had begun to decline before the financial 
crisis set in.60  While not taking a firm position on the causality 
issue, throughout his analysis, Bernanke stressed the 
importance of recognizing the role of exogenous events, which 
influence estimates of future cash flows and lead to endogenous 
changes in prevailing levels of risk adversity in the availability 
of credit and contractions in the money supply.61 
&DQ %HUQDQNH·V LQVLJKWV H[SODLQ WKH XQGHU-­pricing of 
subprime risk?  Could the liquidity of Asian and Middle 
Eastern investors be viewed as an exogenous factor?  Or, could 
this under-­pricing have been intentional and not the result of 
euphoria or ignorance?  As the market for mortgages grew to 
include private entities³who bought, sold, and packaged 
mortgage-­backed securities at a seemingly frenzied pace³the 
race was not only to the swift, but to the bottom as well.  There 
ZDV D ´SHUYHUVH LQFHQWLYHµ RSHUDWLQJ62  The investment 
bankers knew or should have known in advance (after all, they 
KDYHWKHNQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHUWLVHWKDW´WKHLUWLPH>ZRXOG@UXQ
RXWDQGWKH>LQYHVWPHQW@IXQG>ZRXOG@FROODSVHµ63  The strategy 
WKH\ HPSOR\HG ZDV ´WR PD[LPL]H DQQXDO UHWXUQµ EXW RQO\
ostensibly.64  (FRQRPLVW $QWKRQ\ '·$PDWR GHVFULEHs the 
strategy in this way: 
 
Suppose [the bankers] are buying bundled 
mortgages.  Someday, all the mortgages will 
collapse, but until they do the investor in the 
fund has no idea about the comparative risk 
 
58. Id. at 261-­63. 
59. See, e.g., id. at 267. 
60. Id. 
61. See id. at 271. 
62. $QWKRQ\ '·$PDWR Letter: Hedge Funds Race to the Bottom, 
ECONOMISTS· 9OICE, June 2008, at 1, available at 
KWWSZZZEHSUHVVFRPHYYROLVVDUWIROORZ´'RZQORDGµ 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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between types of bundles.  Thus the [banker] will 
simply buy the bundles that come on the market 
with the highest interest rate of return.  (If the 
choice is between bundle A that contains mainly 
prime mortgages and pays 10%, and bundle B 
that contains nothing but the riskiest sub-­prime 
mortgages and pays 14%, the [banker] need not 
engage in any qualitative calculations.  He only 
needs to know that 14 is higher than 10.)  Thus 
there is a race to the bottom.  The worse and 
riskiest bundles (of mortgages or any other debt 
instruments such as car loans or credit cards) 
will attract the most investor money, keeping the 
game alive and compounding it.  Fortunately for 
the [banker], he pays himself annually.  (He also 
takes bonuses, which often exceed his payments 
for managing the fund.)65 
 
The investment bankers had plausible deniability if this 
strategy failed³they could claim earnest and honest reliance 
on the evaluation of the ratings agencies.  But this earnestness 
can now be seen through.  The agencies also responded to the 
incentives inherent in the regulatory use of ratings.66  The 
continued flow of business to the agencies depended upon their 
reports of acceptable ratings.  ,Q0DUFK WKH3UHVLGHQW·V
Working Group on Financial Markets, the two-­decades-­old 
committee representing the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the 
6HFXULWLHV DQG ([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ ´6(&µ DQG WKH
 
65. Id.  In 2006, the CEOs of the big five investment banks, Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, 
took home a total of $166.4 million in bonuses.  See KEVIN CONNOR, NAT·L 
TRAINING & INFO. CTR., ET AL., WALL STREET AND THE MAKING OF THE SUBPRIME 
DISASTER: HOW INVESTMENT BANKS FUELED THE SUBPRIME BOOM, MADE 
BILLIONS, AND CAUSED THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE CRISIS 6-­7 (2007), available 
at http://subprimer.org/files/wall-­street-­and-­the-­making-­of-­the-­subprime-­
disaster.pdf.  In 2007, firm bonuses topped $38 billion.  Id. at 25.  See also 
David Weidner, Making Greed Good, WSJ.COM, Sept. 3, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125189899520579603.html (reporting on 
executive compensation).  These bonuses were made despite more than $50 
billion write-­downs by these companies.  CONNOR, supra, at 22.  In January 
2009, it was discovered that as Merrill Lynch negotiated its takeover by Bank 
of America, it also paid out $4 billion in bonuses at the end of 2008.  Dave 
Krasne, Money for Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A31. 
66. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 14, at 12. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/13
2009] DISQUIET ON THE HOME FRONT 21 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, described the origins 
of the mortgage market fiasco in terms of the conflicts of 
LQWHUHVW EHWZHHQ ZKDW HFRQRPLVWV FDOO WKH ´SULQFLSDOVµ
(investors and homH EX\HUV DQG WKHLU ´DJHQWVµ PRUWJDJH
brokers, securities brokers, and credit analysts).67  Principals 
relied on agents to evaluate the risks on their behalf.68  But the 
agents, whose income largely depended on the number of deals 
they put together, had powerful incentives to understate risk: 
they assumed unrealistically low expected losses on subprime 
pools and failed to revise their assumptions upwards, even in 
the face of rising defaults and changes in the population of loan 
originators and borrowers on the underlying instruments.69  
The estimates were low³not only as to their probability of 
default, but also as to the magnitude of the losses that would 
result.70   
Could there have been too much reliance on mathematical 
models?  Models that purported to manage risks³to capture 
the behavior of a market and to link an observable or illiquid 
price to prices in traded markets?  The modeling became 
problematic when pools of mortgages were bundled up into 
FROODWHUDOL]HG GHEW REOLJDWLRQV ´&'2Vµ71  CDOs, because of 
their complex layering, became impossible to model in any but 
a most rudimentary way, largely because each contained a 
unique combination of assets.72 
 
Each CDO would be sold on the basis of its own 
scenario, using central assumptions about the 
future of interest rates and defaults to 
´GHPRQVWUDWHµWKHSD\RXWVRYHUVD\WKHQH[W
 
67. See generally THE PRESIDENT·S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., 
POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT (2008), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_031
22008.pdf [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT];; THE PRESIDENT·S WORKING GROUP 
ON FIN. MKTS., PROGRESS UPDATE ON MARCH POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL 
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (2008) [hereinafter PROGRESS UPDATE], available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/q4progress%20update.pdf. 
68. See generally POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67;; PROGRESS UPDATE, 
supra note 67. 
69. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 14. 
70. Id. 
71. See supra notes 62-­65 and accompanying text. 
72. See Greed³and Fear, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT) (London), Jan. 
24, 2009, at 4. 
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years.  This central scenario would then be 
´VWUHVV-­WHVWHGµ WR VKRZ WKDW WKH &'2 ZDV
robust³though oddly the tests did not include a 
20% fall in house prices.73 
 
History is a dangerous basis for modeling.74  The models also 
failed to take into account other critical variables, like falling 
underwriting standards (i.e., not requiring documentation or 
little documentation, and accepting low credit scores), and 
conflicts of interests affecting the ratings by credit ratings 
agencies.75  It seems that corporate and mortgage-­backed 
VHFXULWLHV´ZHUHDOHDSLQWKHGDUNµDVQRRQHNQHZZKDWWKH\
were ignoring, and therefore failed to correct for any 
inadequacies in the model.76 
The most prominent mathematical model employed was 
WKH ´9DOXH-­at-­5LVNµ PRGHO EXLOW DURXQG ORQJ-­standing 
statistical ideas and probability theories.77  It purports to 
measure the boundaries of risk in a portfolio over short 
GXUDWLRQVDVVXPLQJD´QRUPDOµPDUNHWWKDWis, to measure the 
SRWHQWLDO ORVVHV RI D SRUWIROLR VXSSRVHGO\ ´WR VKRZ ZKHWKHU
banks and other financial outfits are being safely run. . . . [And] 
KRZPXFK FDSLWDO EDQNVQHHG WRSXW DVLGH IRU D UDLQ\GD\µ78  
For instance, if one has $50 million of weekly value at risk, 
that means that over the course of the next week, there is a 99 
SHUFHQW FKDQFH WKDW RQH·V SRUWIROLR ZRQ·W ORVH PRUH WKDQ 
million.79  That should provide a bit of comfort to the investor, 
particularly one whose investments are fairly diversified.  But 
the essential and overwhelming flaw in the formula, one so 
large as to put into question its fundamental soundness, is that 
LWRQO\PHDVXUHVNQRZQULVNVQRW´WDLOULVNVµWKDWLVULVNVDW
 
73. ,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, supra note 56, at 13. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id.  The model was developed and popularized in the 1990s by 
´TXDQWVµ VKRUW-­hand for financial economists who apply quantification 
formulas for investment decisions.  Nocera, supra note 53, at 26. 
78. ,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, supra note 56, at 13. 
79. Nocera, supra note 53, at 29.  For an example of miscalculations in 
1998 by the hedge fund, Long-­Term Capital Management, see FERGUSON, 
supra note 9, at 325-­27.  See also infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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the extremes of investment decisions.80  The model assumes a 
normal distribution of changes and risks in the market,81 
looking only to the short-­term, and only a few years back, and 
does not distinguish between the leverage that comes from 
long-­term fixed rate debt (such as bonds) and that from loans 
callable at any time.82  What is not reported is the impact of the 
UHPDLQLQJRQHSHUFHQWRUWKH´EODFNVZDQVµRU´GUDJRQVµ83  It 
GRHVQRWWHOO\RXIRULQVWDQFH´>W@KDWWKHPLOOLRQ>LVQ·W@MXVW
the most one could lose 99 percent of the time.  It [in fact] was 
WKH OHDVW \RX FRXOG ORVH  SHUFHQW RI WKH WLPHµ84  Too much 
reliance on the fact of quantification, rather than on market 
observations and the not-­so-­distant historical trends, and too 
much absence of judgment are the essential culprits in this 
crisis.85 
Even if the asset managers knowingly underpriced the 
risk, how could institutional investors have accepted the asset 
PDQDJHUV· DVVHVVPHQWs at face value³particularly with so 
little market history to examine³since subprime loans were, 
relatively speaking, a rather new investment tool?  Only after 
2006 did the subprime mortgage losses begin to rise 
dramatically.86  The relatively low rate of losses occurred 
during a time of economic boom, where the probability of 
default and loss given default was expected to be low.  If the 
investors had knowledge of the composition of the pool³i.e., 
that there was a greater percentage of higher-­risk borrowers, 
with a greater percentage of adjustable rate mortgages³they 
might have suspected that under-­pricing of risk was occurring.  
 
80. See Nocera, supra note 53, at 46. 
81. The research, however, clearly shows that the market is wildly 
unstable.  6HH ,Q 3ODWR·V &DYH, supra note 56, at 14 (describing a study by 
mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot, who invented the fractal theory). 
82. See Nocera, supra note 53, at 29.  In markets, extreme events are 
surprisingly common³WKHWDLOVDUH´IDWµId.;; ,Q3ODWR·V&DYH, supra note 56, 
at 14. 
83. See Nocera, supra note 53, at 29.  See also supra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
84. Nocera, supra note 53, at 50. 
85. Id. at 50.  The use of these models in valuing MBS is in stark 
contrast to the method of valuing corporate debt, where the particulars of the 
institution are considered and evaluated.  Mizen, supra note 17, at 541, 545. 
86. SHARON L. STARK & ZHONG YI TONG, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, 
MONTHLY MARKET MONITOR 11, 14-­15 (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/131020.pdf. 
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Still the omens were apparent, as early as 2005, with evidence 
of mounting performance problems and calls for vigilance by 
economists87³but the originators kept writing loans, indeed at 
a feverish pace.  Ratings agencies transparently understated 
risk and inflated the grading scale of their debt ratings for 
securitized products in order for institutional investors to 
invest and stay within their guidelines and regulations.88  This 
occurred when the ratings agencies ceased to be dispassionate 
appraisers of the merits of the product, and instead, worked to 
reach a desired rating by participating in discussions about 
exactly how to design and structure the securities.89 
While it was true that there were capital requirements in 
place, these requirements were either relaxed by the SEC, or 
evaded by conduits of MBS through the device of a structured 
investment vehicle.90  Again, subterfuges and obfuscations 
were prevalent. 
 
 
87. See generally KRISTOPHER S. GERARDI ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
BOSTON, MAKING SENSE OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2009) (stating that, given 
the available data, market participants should have been able to understand 
that a fall in prices would have had disastrous consequences for the market, 
but instead, assigned a low probability to such an outcome);; Paul Krugman, 
Op-­Ed., That Hissing Sound, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A15 (same);; Robert 
-6KLOOHU´,UUDWLRQDO([XEHUDQFHµ³Part 2, MONEY, Feb. 2005, at 71 (same). 
88. See William G. McGuinness & John W. Brewer, Credit Ratings 
Agencies Under the Microscope, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5, 2009, at S6. 
89. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 1-­2;; PROGRESS UPDATE, 
supra note 67, at 1-­3. 
90. In 2001, a new Treasury rule was adopted that essentially stated 
that when retaining a first-­loss position in a securitization conduit, the 
sponsoring institution was required to maintain an equal amount of capital to 
the size of the retained position.  However, this requirement could be 
FLUFXPYHQWHGWKURXJKWKHGHYLFHRIDVWUXFWXUHGLQYHVWPHQWYHKLFOH ´6,9µ
See 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567.1, 567.5, 567.6 (2009) (exempting 
conduit sponsors from newly enacted GAAP consolidation rules for 
securitization, which otherwise would have required securitized assets to be 
treated as on-­balance sheet assets for purposes of calculating capital 
requirements).  An SIV is an entity, typically a corporation or trust formed by 
investment banks, to sell or to hold mortgage-­backed securities, owned by, 
but legally distinct from, the lender.  Risk-­Based Capital Guidelines;; Capital 
Adequacy Guidelines;; Capital Maintenance: Consolidation of Asset-­Backed 
Commercial Paper Programs and Other Related Issues, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,908-­
01 (July 28, 2004).  The SIV may resell the loan pools to a second SIV, which 
is also independent of the lender and takes title to the bundle.  The second 
SPV is typically in the form of a trust.  See id.  A Treasury exemption made 
this ruse legal.  See id. 
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III.  Crisis in the Courts and Havoc With Land Titles 
 
Many of the firms that profited from the subprime lending 
boom are now hobbling and experiencing severe losses as they 
are forced to contract.  Many are insolvent.  Many have seen 
their stock prices plummet.  As one might expect, securities 
fraud claims have been filed against these firms and their 
directors and officers, charging, among other things, 
misrepresentation about the nature and quality of the assets 
underlying the securities, as well as breach of fiduciary duty in 
continuing to deal in the subprime market despite clear 
evidence of impending collapse.91 
State court dockets have swelled with foreclosure 
complaints.  State courts are the only venues for such relief, as 
foreclosures began in the early courts of equity where they gave 
mortgagors a right to redeem their property before 
foreclosure.92  Federal bankruptcy courts, as homeowners and 
 
91. One study reports as many as 136 securities class action suits based 
on subprime losses filed as of early 2008.  JENNIFER E. BETHEL ET AL., 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, LAW AND ECONOMICS ISSUES IN SUBPRIME LITIGATION 
67-­72 (2008), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1400&context=harvard_olin.  
Other research suggests that the forty-­three percent rise in securities 
violations cases in 2007 may have been attributable to the subprime 
mortgage crisis.  See U.S. CHAMBERS INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2, 5 n.7 (2008), available at 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213.  Nonetheless, 
shareholders seeking recovery against corporate officers and directors will be 
met with the almost insurmountable barriers of the Private Litigation 
Securities Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-­67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-­4(b)(2) (2006)) (imposing heightened pleading 
requirements and requiring particularity on the element of scienter) and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-­353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal securities litigation 
claims).  To date, there has been at least one suit against an ERISA fiduciary 
that alleges breach of fiduciary duty by investing in subprime mortgage 
backed securities.  See generally Thomas J. Hall & Thomas J. McCormack, 
Financial Meltdown Triggers Litigation Wave, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5, 2009, at S2 
(discussing the various kinds of suits filed, including misrepresentations by 
CDO issuers, securities fraud, funding suspension, unfair and defective 
practices against loan originators, and breach of fiduciary duty by corporate 
officers and directors);; Manfred Ohrenstein & Matthew Bryant, Subprime 
Litigation: New Theories, Same Rules, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 2008, at 4. 
92. In 2007, 57,000 foreclosure complaints were filed in New York, 
representing a ten percent increase in filings from 2006, and a fifty-­five 
percent increase from 2005.  See Joel Stashenko, Pfau Tells Lawmakers 
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LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV VHHN DXWRPDWLF VWD\V RI FUHGLWRUV· DFWLRQV93 
and federal courts of general jurisdiction, with exclusive 
jurisdiction over securities fraud claims, have also experienced 
dramatic increases in case filings. 
In the state court proceedings, attorneys for mortgagors 
are taking the offensive and asserting traditional causes of 
action against lenders³including civil fraud, unfair debt 
collection practices, and predatory lending claims³but they 
are also advancing new theories for recovery of damages from 
mortgagees and to preclude foreclosure.94  Because they played 
more than their usual role as evaluators of creditworthiness, 
credit rating agencies may also face suit as participants in 
fraudulent schemes.95  Both the SEC and the Attorney General 
of New York have already opened investigations into the 
 
Courts Not Equipped to Handle Proposed Foreclosure Conferences, N.Y. L.J., 
May 13, 2008, at 1.  In the first three months of 2008, filings were fourteen 
percent over the first three months of 2007.  Id.  See also N.Y. CT. R. 212.12-­a 
(requiring pre-­foreclosure court conferences, with the aim to avert foreclosure 
through modifications, forbearances, and extensions);; Ann Pfau, Residential 
Mortgage Foreclosure Program, Essay, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 19, 2008, at 6 
(discussing the new Court Rule in New York State and the programs set up 
by legal services entities to assist homeowners in the process). 
93. A recent article estimated that of the $633 billion of Lehman 
%URWKHUV· GHEW  ELOOLRQ LV WKH SURMHFWHG DPRXQW RI IHHV WKDW ODZ\HUV
accountants, and other professionals may earn from working on that 
bankruptcy.  Jill Schachner Chanen, Lehman by the Numbers, 95 A.B.A. J. 
12, 12 (2009).  Of that $1.6 billion, $53 million is projected as fees to counsel 
for the Creditors· &RPPLWWHH DQG  PLOOLRQ IRU WKH ILUP·V EDQNUXSWF\
counsel.  Id. 
94. See Steven Seidenberg, Homing In On Foreclosure: Lawyers Are 
Finding Aggressive Defenses Against Foreclosure Actions. And Courts Are 
Listening As Never Before, 94 A.B.A. J. 54, 54 (2008);; White & Hirschhorn, 
supra note 21, at 20.  Another theory that may be available to buyers of MBS 
is to argue that they are third-­party beneficiaries of these contracts between 
the borrowers and lenders, and that therefore, can assert claims against 
those in this nexus for fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of mortgages in 
the pool, for failure to enforce the underlying mortgages and for failure to 
make good on insurance and guarantees.  See Seidenberg, supra, at 54;; White 
& Hirschhorn, supra note 21, at 20. 
95. See McGuinness & Brewer, supra note 88, at S6.  But, will credit 
ratings agencies succumb to liability in suits by purchasers of the securities 
they rated?  Traditionally they have fared well because of several theoretical 
barriers, including those that find that the ratings were merely opinions and 
therefore protected by the First Amendment, as well as those that find no 
showing of malice, no reliance, no causation, and thus no common questions 
of law or fact to enable class certification.  See id. 
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underwritings and sales of mortgage-­backed securities.96 
Title insurers now face tremendous risks because of the 
way in which securitization of mortgages is done.  Often no 
formal assignment of the mortgage is made;; that is, entities 
involved in originating and securitizing loans frequently do not 
comply with the formalities of assigning the mortgage notes 
and physically transferring them.97  This means that a title 
search will not necessarily reveal who owns the mortgage.  One 
significant consequence of this system is that, at the time of a 
foreclosure action, the foreclosing entity may not be the current 
right holder.98 
 
IV. Call For Ethics and Reforms 
 
The failure of finance will affect ideology.  Perhaps, 
because the crisis in the markets was unprecedented and its 
RULJLQVVRQRYHOWKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQW·VUHVSRQVHVFRXOGQRW
be anything other than piecemeal, ad hoc, and a form of trial 
and error.  The crisis hit worldwide, as financial systems across 
the globe are highly interconnected.99 
American economist, Irving Fisher, remarked nearly a 
century ago that once started, deflation tends to feed on 
itself.100  As incomes fall in a depressed economy, the burden of 
debt becomes more onerous, and the prospect of further decline 
produces a demoralizing effect and discourages investment.  
 
96. See SEC Probes Subprime, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, at 
1. 
97. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 
07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 
07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 
WL 3232430, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007).  See also /D6DOOH%DQN1DW·O
$VV·QY/DP\1<6G6XS&WPRUWJDJes that were in the 
process of foreclosure had been assigned by Mortgage Electronic Registration 
6\VWHPV ,QF ´0(56µ EXW QRWHV KDG QRW \HW EHHQ WUDQVIHUUHG  )RU D
discussion of MERS, see MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90 (2006). 
98. See generally Seidenberg, supra note 94 (reporting on the dismissal 
of fourteen separate foreclosure complaints because the plaintiffs failed to 
produce documentation confirming that they were the holders and owners of 
the mortgages on which they were seeking to foreclose).  See also, e.g., In re 
Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3. 
99. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 8-­9, 15-­16. 
100. See Paul Krugman, On the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A27. 
21
28 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:7 
The result is a spiral to the death.101  The same can be said for 
other forms of financing instability;; the cycle is self-­
propagating and self-­fulfilling.102 
7KH*RYHUQPHQW·V ILUVW UHVSRQVH WR WKH ORRPLQJ ILQDQFLDO
crisis was to provide liquidity to markets generally.  It made 
money available for short-­term loans and it lowered the target 
rate for federal funds.103  But in early 2008, when the evidence 
started mounting that many firms were overextended, a panic 
set in.104 
In September 2008, the Federal Government placed 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship as a 
preemptive measure against collapse GXH WR WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV·
mountains of debt.105  When the monetary policy measures 
proved ineffective, the Secretary of the Treasury thought the 
only way to get the economy moving again was by removing the 
troubled assets from the EDQNV· books.106  This plan was 
 
101. See id. 
102. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 55, at 21-­29. 
103. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 5.  See also DAY, YI TONG & 
MALMQUIST, Nov. 2008, supra QRWHDWQRWLQJWKDW´WKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH
lowered the target rate for federal funds on December 16[, 2008] to a range 
betweHQ ]HUR DQG  >EDVH SRLQWV@µ See also generally FED. RESERVE BD., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2008: MONETARY POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/annual08/sec1/c1.htm. 
104. The case of Bear Stearns stands out.  In March 2008, while the firm 
was solvent, it was highly leveraged (and heavily dependent upon overnight 
repossessions).  Mizen, supra note 17, at 549.  Creditors were unwilling to 
allow the firm to hobble along until it eventually collapsed under its own 
weight.  Id.  Previously, two hedge funds that were advised by Bear and were 
created to invest subprime mortgage-­related assets had collapsed.  Id. at 533.  
%HFDXVH RI %HDU·V KHDY\ H[SRVXUH WR PRUWJDJH-­related assets, its creditors 
became jittery, despite the fact that the firm was adequately capitalized 
under SEC rules and its secured debt was UDWHG$$$E\6WDQGDUG	3RRU·V  
Id. at 559.  The Federal Reserve intervened to broker a deal to rescue Bear 
Stearns.  Id. at 549, 557-­58. 
105. On September 7, 2008, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency announced the Federal takeover;; both entities were placed into 
conservatorship run by the Federal Housing Finance Agency in order to 
ensure their financial soundness.  See Statement of James B. Lockhart, 
Director, Federal Housing and Finance Agency (Sept. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa_statement_090708hp112
8.pdf. 
106. See 7URXEOHG$VVHWV5HOLHI3URJUDP´7$53µ3XE/1R-­343, 
122 Stat. 3768 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-­41).  Under the 
Program, $700 billion was appropriated for, among other things, the 
purchase of worthless assets from firms.  Id. 
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designed to address the SKHQRPHQRQ RI ´FRXQWHUSDUW\ ULVNµ
WKDW LV WKH VLWXDWLRQ WKDW RFFXUV ZKHQ WKH ZLQQHUV·107 extra 
VSHQGLQJPD\QRWRIIVHWWKHORVHUV·108 retrenchment.109  And the 
losers may not be able to afford to pay out, because they do not 
have the money³they are insolvent³or because they cannot 
easily raise the money³they are illiquid.110  By effectively 
recapitalizing banks, the Treasury would minimize the 
appearance of counterparty risk.111  In later efforts, the 
Treasury opted to purchase equity stakes in the distressed 
financial institutions.112 
 
107. I.e., those whose investments pay off. 
108. I.e., those whose investments sink. 
109. See Strategy: Signs of an Early American Recovery, FUND STRATEGY, 
Nov. 24, 2008, at 16 (2008) (London). 
110. See id.  In fact, the bulk of the cash infusions were used as 
recapitalizations.  See generally U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General 
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, www.sigtarp.gov/reports.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (reporting on the use of TARP funds).  Without it, it 
was thought that many banks would have become insolvent.  Still, the 
underlying problems remain³the toxic assets are still on the books and 
banks are still not lending.  See David Stout, Better Answers Sought on 
%DQNV·8VH RI $LG, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at B8 (reporting on how the 
original strategy proved ineffective as banks hoarded their new capital 
instead of making loans);; Regulator Says Bailout Fund is Misleading the 
Public, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at B2 (reporting that testimony before a 
Senate oversight committee claimed that Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
M. Paulson, Jr., had misled Congress by not doing what he said he would do;; 
that the EDLORXW ´ZDVRSDTXHDWEHVWµ;; that of the $254 billion invested into 
financial institutions at the time, only $176 million in value had been 
received;; and that the shortfall was not accounted for or explained).  
$PHULFDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO*URXS´$,*µRQFHWKHZRUOG·VODUJHVWLQVXUHUZDV
bailed out by the Federal Government when it became clear that it would not 
be able to honor its vast one-­way bets on financial stability.  James Bullard, 
Christopher J. Neely & David C. Wheelock, Systemic Risk and the Financial 
Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (PART I) 403, 412 
(2009).  If AIG had failed, the banks on the other side would have been in 
trouble.  Although the market netted to zero, it was poised for disaster.  Id. 
111. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Understanding the 
Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 556 (2009).  However, the 
VLJQLILFDQW HDUO\ SUREOHP ZLWK WKLV SURJUDP ZDV YDOXLQJ WKHVH ´WURXEOHG
DVVHWVµ  Id. at 557-­58.  In order to maintain the appearance, the Federal 
Government would have to pay market value³but how to value assets that 
have no reliable market value is not clear.  Cf. id. at 558 (positing that the 
Government must pay more than the fair market value of the troubled 
assets).  This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of transparency in 
the packaging and pooling of the underlying assets.  See id. at 557-­58. 
112. See Tarp Capital Purchase Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 62205-­01 (Oct. 
30, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30).  Under the Program, the Treasury 
Department will aim to fund the banking system by purchasing stock in 
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´The case for doing something to prevent the next financial 
PDUNHWPHOWGRZQLVFRPSHOOLQJ:KDWWKDW¶VRPHWKLQJ·VKRXOG
EH WKRXJK LVQRWµ113  The Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
Department sensibly acted quickly to shore up confidence in 
PDUNHWV DQG WR KHDG RII ORVVHV  ´+RZHYHU KLVWRU\ VXJJHVWV
 
institutions.  $250 billion has been allocated for this program.  See also Press 
5HOHDVH 86 'HS·W RI WKH 7UHDVXU\ 7UHDVXU\ $QQRXQFHV 7$53 &DSLWDO
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at 
www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm.  On November 25, 2008, the 
Federal Reserve unveiled two plans, totaling $800 billion, aimed at boosting 
spending and limiting damage from the weakening economy.  The first, titled 
the Term Asset-­Backed Securities /RDQ )DFLOLW\ ´7$/)µ FUHDWHG D 
billion lending facility to spur purchases of securities backed by consumer 
and small-­business loans.  See FED. RESERVE, TERM ASSET-­BACKED SECURITIES 
LOAN FACILITY (TALF) TERMS AND CONDITIONS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/monetary2008112
5a1.pdf.  The program makes loans to holders of certain asset-­backed 
securities collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and 
loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration.  Id.  In the second 
program, the Federal Reserve will buy up to $100 billion in direct debt issued 
by Government-­6SRQVRUHG(QWHUSULVHV´*6(VµDQGmakes a similar pledge 
to buy up to $500 billion in mortgage-­backed debt issued by the GSEs.  See 
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Announces it Will Initiate 
a Program to Purchase the Direct Obligations of Housing-­Related 
Government-­Sponsored Enterprises (Nov. 25, 2008), available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/200811256.htm.  The 
Federal Reserve put into place several protections against losses, including 
limiting the lending facility to securities that hold the highest investment 
rating from two or more nationally recognized credit rating agencies.  See 
FED. RESERVE, supra, at 1-­3.  Also, investors must provide the Reserve with 
collateral worth more than loans they receive from TALF, id. at 2-­3, and 
must set up special purpose vehicles that will be used to hold or sell 
securities if borrowers default on the underlying credit exposures, see id. at 3.  
On December 3, 2008, the Federal Reserve reported to Congress that it had 
purchased $40 billion of stock in American International Group under the 
Capital Purchase Program.  See FED. RESERVE, PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: 
UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD 
UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 7 (2008), 
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2009).  As of December 2008, the Reserve had signed 
agreements with 84 financial institutions, under the CPP, committing $165 
billion.  See Capital Purchase Program, Transaction Report (2008), 
www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/CPPTransaction%20ReportDec%209.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (listing the institutions purchased under the 
program and the costs paid for each as of December 9, 2008).  Nine of the 
largest banks in the nation received the first $125 billion.  See id.  Citigroup 
received $25 billion.  Id. 
113. Robert Hahn & Peter Passell, The Rush to Re-­Regulate, 
ECONOMISTS· VOICE, July 2008, at 3, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss3/art5/ (folloZ´'RZQORDGµ 
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that tackling an ambitious agenda for reform in the midst of a 
financial crisis is an invitation to bad regulation³regulation 
whose costs exceed the benefits;; regulation that serves the 
interests of politically connected insiders rather than those of 
WKHSXEOLFµ114 
Now that there has been much time and much 
consideration of the flaws and interrelatedness of the markets 
and the effects of the practices by industry participants, 
regulatory and industry reforms can be thoughtfully conceived.  
The focus should be on systemic damage.  These reforms must 
have at least three aims: first, to preserve homeownership;; 
second, to protect the integrity of the markets;; and third, to 
avoid the moral hazard. 
 
A. Preserving Homeownership 
 
Inasmuch as the financial crisis began with falling home 
prices and fears sparked by rampant mortgage defaults, it 
seems that the first step out of this crisis is to stem the rate of 
foreclosures.  Remaining TARP funds115 should be used to buy 
up assets and then to refinance the mortgages underlying those 
assets.116 
Many different kinds of interventions have been proposed 
and implemented.  The proposals have included: requiring 
refinancing of loans underlying the mortgages held by the 
GSEs;;117 permitting states to refinance loans at risk of 
 
114. Id. 
115. See supra note 106. 
116. However, because of the multilayer and split-­up nature of 
securitized mortgages, modification of individual loans may be difficult even 
for creditors so inclined. 
117. See, e.g., 3UHVV 5HOHDVH 86 'HS·W RI WKH 7UHDVXU\ Treasury 
Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Neel Kashkari Remarks 
on GSE, HOPE NOW Streamlined Loan Modification Program (Nov. 11, 
2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1264.htm;; United 
States Department of Housing and 8UEDQ'HYHORSPHQW ´86'+8'µ )DFW
Sheet: Hope for Homeowners to Provide Additional Mortgage Assistance to 
Struggling Homeowners, 
http://www.hud.gov/hopeforhomeowners/pressfactsheet.cfm (last visited Aug. 
14, 2009).  Under the Hope for Homeowners program, the Federal Housing 
Administration insures troubled loans if the lender first agrees to write off a 
portion of the principal.  USDHUD, supra.  Eligible loans would include those 
with loan-­to-­value ratios up to 96.5 percent for borrowers whose refinancing 
mortgage payments represent no more than 31 percent of their monthly gross 
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foreclosure through issuance of federal tax-­exempt mortgage 
revenue bonds;;118 and creating a new federal corporation to 
purchase distressed mortgages from investors and convert 
them to 30-­year fixed-­rate mortgages.119 
There have also been proposals for moratoria on 
foreclosures.  In early 2009, the legislatures of several states 
introduced bills that would have imposed them.120  
Additionally, similar legislation was also introduced in 
Congress.121  There is much debate about the wisdom and 
 
income, and whose total debt does not exceed 43 percent of their income.  Id.  
Lenders may also extend mortgage terms to 40 years in order to reduce 
monthly payments.  Id.  Another proposal would have the Federal 
*RYHUQPHQWVKDUHWKHFRVWRIUHGXFLQJDERUURZHU·VPRQWKO\SD\PHQWId.  A 
lender or servicer would initiate a loan modification and agree to reduce 
SD\PHQWV WR SHUKDSV  SHUFHQW RI D ERUURZHU·V LQFRPH WKH *RYHUQPHQW
would then step in and subsidize a further reduction, to perhaps 31 percent.  
Id.  Previously, the FDIC announced a plan to refinance loans issued by 
failed banks that it had taken over.  See FDIC, Loan Modification Program 
for Distressed Indymac Mortgage Loans, 
www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/modification/indymac.html (last visited Nov. 1, 
2009).  On March 4, 2009, Fannie Mae announced the Obama 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ·V SODQ WR KHOS SUHVHUYH KRPH RZQHUVKLS ´0DNLQJ +RPH
$IIRUGDEOHµ ZKLFK ZLOO KHOS UHILQDQFH PRUWJDJHV KHOd or guaranteed by 
FannieMae.  See Fannie Mae, Making Home Affordable, 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/mha/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 14, 2009). 
118. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-­
289, § 1338, 122 Stat. 2654, 2712-­23 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4568). 
119. 7KLV ODVW SURSRVDO ZRXOG PLPLF WKH +RPH 2ZQHUV· /RDQ
&RUSRUDWLRQ ´+2/&µZKLFKZDVHVWDEOLVKHG WRSXUchase delinquent home 
mortgages during the Great Depression.  See Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 64, § 1, 
48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-­68 (2006)).  The 
HOLC is viewed as having been highly successful, and it achieved this 
success at low taxpayer cost³there was only an initial $200 million 
capitalization, and this was eventually repaid.  David C. Wheelock, The 
Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons From the Great 
Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (PART I) 133, 144 (2008).  
HOLC purchased about a million loans from their originators and then 
refinanced them as long-­term, fixed-­rate, fully-­amortized loans that were 
payable in monthly installments.  Id. at 146.  Although it purchased only 
delinquent loans, it ended up foreclosing on fewer than twenty percent of the 
refinanced loans.  Id. 
120. See, e.g., H. 1510, 186th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009);; H. 2233, 86th Leg. 
Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009);; A. 8236A, 232nd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009);; S. 
4109B, 232nd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).  See also David C. Wheelock, Changing 
the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great 
Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 570 (2008). 
121. See S. 2734, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).  See also MURPHY, supra 
note 23, at 1;; Wheelock, supra note 120, at 570. 
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efficacy of moratoria.122  Opponents argue that foreclosure 
moratoria make loans costlier³with higher interest rates in 
order to compensate for the added risks associated with an 
inability to foreclose³and more difficult to obtain³due to 
OHQGHUV· UHVWULcting the supply of their loans.123  At the same 
time, lenders benefit in the short run from moratoria as they 
allow time for the development of programs to refinance 
delinquent mortgages.  Without moratoria, high foreclosure 
rates reduce property values, prompting still more foreclosures, 
leading to a downward spiral in property values, and thereby 
hurting lenders and contributing to further reduction in 
mortgage failures.124 
Congress should amend the bankruptcy code and give 
bankruptcy judges the power to modify the mortgages of 
debtors in bankruptcy.125 
 
B. Protecting the Integrity of the Markets 
 
Banks are the essential engines of the economy.  As the 
 
122. Many lenders in the last year have imposed voluntary moratoria on 
foreclosures.  During the Great Depression, by one estimate, approximately 
one-­half of all urban home mortgages were delinquent, as of the beginning of 
1934.  See Wheelock, supra note 120, at 569.  State and local governments 
responded by changing state laws governing foreclosure.  Id. at 570.  These 
PHDVXUHV LQFOXGHG HQKDQFHPHQWV RI ERUURZHUV· UHGHPSWLRQ ULJKWV DQG
limiting deficiency judgments.  Id. 
123. Id. at 580.  David Wheelock, Assistant Vice President and 
Economist for the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, suggests that the states 
ignored this reality, believing that unrestricted foreclosures would result in 
many people becoming homeless simultaneously.  See id. at 580.  He further 
suggests that these moratoria were also expedients to buy time while the 
economy recovered.  See id. at 580. 
124. Id. at 581. 
125. The current policy of not permitting a bankruptcy workout on a 
PRUWJDJHVHFXUHGE\DSULPDU\UHVLGHQFHLV´LQWHQGHGWRHQFRXUDJHWKHIORZ
RI FDSLWDO LQWR WKH KRPH OHQGLQJ PDUNHWµ  $GDP - /HYLWLQ 	 -RVKXD
Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-­Down on Mortgage Markets 4 
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 1087816, 2008) (quoting 
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087816 (follow 
´'RZQORDGµ  7KDW LV, by providing greater security to investors with the 
recourse of foreclosure, it is possible for lenders to offer lower interest rates 
on primary residences, thereby encouraging the expansion of homeownership 
among borrowers who would otherwise be unable to afford payments based 
on higher interest rates.  Id. 
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recent measures of the health of economy have revealed in the 
last two years³such as through dismal reports on consumer 
spending, unemployment, and exports³when banks became 
dysfunctional, economic activity stopped.  Wall Street is still 
reeling and still contracting.  Although some assets, such as 
good quality corporate debt, seem cheap, investors are still 
skittish.  Instead, what we are experiencing is what Keynes 
FDOOHG WKH ´SDUDGR[ RI WKULIWµ126 in which household savings 
grow and the financial services industry sheds its debt, thereby 
leading to a further reduction in spending³which means no 
earnings for sellers of services and products, and in turn, that 
people lose jobs.  While the Federal Reserve seems committed 
WR UHVFXLQJ ELJ LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV ´WRR FRPSOH[ WR IDLOµ127 
correction of the turmoil in the markets calls for policies that 
are well-­orchestrated and coherent, so as to guide us forward, 
and to avoid waste and future disruptions.  One economist has 
UHPDUNHG WKDW WRGDWH ´WKH JRYHUQPHQWKDGGRQH LWZLWK DQ
extreme degree of inconsistency.  You almost have to be trying 
to do things in an incoherent and inconsistent way to end up 
with the huge range of ways they have come up with to address 
WKHVHSUREOHPVµ128 
But is a complete rewriting of financial regulation in order, 
or should finance be free to innovate?  During the Great 
'HSUHVVLRQ $PHULFD WULHG WR WDPH ILQDQFH·V PRVW GDQJHURXV
traits through heavy regulation aimed at safety.129  However 
clear-­sighted such a move seems now, it should not be followed 
at this time without taking advantage of hindsight³that is, a 
look at the circumstances of the Great Depression in 
FRPSDULVRQ WRZKDW LV RFFXUULQJ WRGD\  ´,Q  WKH8QLWHG
States economy had shrunk by one-­third in real terms since 
1929.  Industrial production had fallen by 40 percent.  
Unemployment had soared to 25 percent, from 3 percent in 
 
126. See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936). 
127. Hahn & Passell, supra note 113, at 1. 
128. Television Interview by Fox Business Network with David 
Swenson, Yale Univ. Chief Inv. Officer (Jan. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/business-­leaders/yale-­investment-­
chief-­sticking-­tried-­tested/ (follow the first video image). 
129. See Fixing Finance, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT) (London), Jan. 24, 
2009, at 20, 21. 
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µ130  In addition to the Reconstruction Finance 
&RUSRUDWLRQ´5)&µEX\LQJXSVWRFNLQEDQNs³at a cost 
RIELOOLRQZKLFKLVDERXWELOOLRQLQWRGD\·VGROODUV³
the Roosevelt-­era Congress also put into place a whole slate of 
remedial measures, such as bank deposit insurance and 
disclosure requirements for securities issuers.131  Other 
measures were also enacted that aimed to raise prices by 
reducing or controlling output.132  Congress did this through 
initiatives such as the National Industrial Recovery Act,133 
which had been championed by big businesses.  The effects of 
these measures and their restraint and retardation of 
commerce were long-­standing.134 
If we agree that the fundamentals of the lending and 
banking sectors are sound, that the crisis resulted from a 
confluence of fortuitous or exogenous circumstances (i.e., a 
huge availability of liquidity by foreign investors and sovereign 
wealth funds, as well as by opportunistic conduct from a small 
number of market participants), then a lightly regulated 
finance industry will be in our best interest. 
 
130. Steve Lohr, Something to Fear, After All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, 
at B1.  The day after his inauguration on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt 
´GHFODUHG D QDWLRQDO EDQN KROLGD\ DQG VHW WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH DQG WKH
Treasury to work on a phased program to sort good banks from bad ones, 
provide financing and restore confidence in tKH EDQNLQJ V\VWHPµ  Id.  
Measures were also carried out by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
´5)&µHVWDEOLVKHGLQId.  ´7KHDJHQF\PDGHORDQVWRWURXEOHGEDQNV
and seized and sold off distressed assets at others.  After government 
inspections, many small banks never reopened, with more than 4,000 closed 
LQ µ  Id.  Historians have speculated that had the government 
intervened sooner, recovery would have been quicker.  Id.  As it stood, the 
economy did not fully revive until a decade after the crash, in great measure 
as a consequence of the military escalation for World War II.  Id.  Most 
historians still recognize the need for massive government spending³´>E@\
1942, total government spending as a share of the economy rose to 52 
percent, and peaked at nearly 70 percent in 1944, when unemployment fell to 
SHUFHQWµId. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, § 1, 48 
Stat. 195-­211 (repealed 1935).  The Act was later declared unconstitutional as 
a violation of the Commerce Clause.  See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
134. Among other things, the Act exempted industries from antitrust 
prosecution if they agreed to enter into collective bargaining agreements with 
their workers, which significantly raised wages.  As a consequence, the price 
of goods and services increased at the same time that wages became inflated. 
29
36 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:7 
To address the immediate crisis and to provide confidence 
in the future, we should resist calls to close the Federal 
5HVHUYH·V ´GLVFRXQW ZLQGRZµ;; the federal regulations and 
programs are a way to direct assistance to needy entities 
without changing monetary policy, as well as a way to empower 
the Reserve to move quickly toward a measure of price 
stability.  The Federal Reserve should, though, remain the 
lender of last resort, and when it lends it should do so on a 
´SHQDOW\ UDWH LH RQ JRRG EXW QRW SHUIHFW FROODWHUDOµ135  
Public money should come with strings attached;; if a rescue of 
the next Bear Stearns is to occur, the beneficiaries of the rescue 
should pay.  Congress and the Treasury Department are only 
now coming to this stance after learning of the billions of 
dollars paid in bonuses to employees by banks who received 
bailout monies136 DQG RI &LWLFRUS·V SODQ WR SXUFKDVH D QHZ
corporate jet, arguably enabled by the availability of bailout 
monies.137  The proposed limits on the compensation levels of 
executives of companies who are recipients of taxpayer funds 
should be implemented in a meaningful matter, with few ways 
for circumvention.  The remainder of the TARP funds should 
not be used to bail out the banks, since the facts have shown 
that the interests of the banks do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the nation³they did nothing to make credit available, 
and instead used the public bailout funds to consolidate their 
balance sheets and survive longer.138 
 
135. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY 
MARKET 197 (Hartley Whithers, ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1920) (1873). 
136. See supra note 65. 
137. Joe Nocera, ,W·V1RWWKH%RQXV0RQH\,W·VWKH3ULQFLSOH, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2009, at B1. 
138. ,QWKHVHFRQGJRYHUQPHQWDOEDLORXWRI&LWLJURXS´WD[SD\HUVSRXUHG
$60 billion . . . , increasing the value of Citigroup financial claims by only $44 
ELOOLRQZLWKDQHWORVVRIELOOLRQµ/XLJL=LQJDOHVYes We Can, Secretary 
Geithner, ECONOMISTS· VOICE, Feb. 2009, at 2, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss2/art3/ (follow ´'RZQORDGµ  7KLV PHDQW
WKDW´HDFKGROODUGRQDWHGWRILQDQFLDOLQYHVWRUVFRVWWRWD[SD\HUVZLWK
QRDGGLWLRQDOEHQHILWµId.  Luigi Zingales, Professor of Entrepreneurship and 
Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, believes this 
UHVXOWZDV´HDVLO\SUHGLFWDEOHµVLQFHLWZDVKDUGO\WREHH[SHFWHGWKDWDEDQN
hobbling and newly rescued from disaster, would have the courage to thrust 
itself right back into the volatile economy.  Id.  Instead, Professor Zingales 
suggests that the sensible thing for the Government to have done was to have 
´WDNHQRYHUWKHVHEDQNVDQGGLUHFWHGWKHIORZRIFUHGLWRU[to] have poured in 
an amount of capital so large that even scared bankers would consider 
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Congress should reassess the role of GSEs in the financial 
markets and establish risk controls.139  Together, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed more than $4 trillion of 
home mortgages, of which nearly half were outstanding.140  
When mortgagors default, these GSEs are unable to pay their 
investors their promised returns.  To be sure, the secondary 
market for mortgages is vital to achieving the national goal of 
homeownership, but the risk of losses from these purchases 
should be spread more widely in order to blunt the impact. 
Standards or guidelines should be adopted for credit 
ratings agencies.141  Some suggest that government regulations 
are not necessary because the market will correct the problem 
RI UDWLQJV LWVHOI DV ´RQFH-­burned investors treat ratings 
SURQRXQFHPHQWV PRUH VNHSWLFDOO\µ142  Indeed, regulation of 
credit rating agencies may do more harm than good by 
XQGHUPLQLQJ LQYHVWRUV· LQFHQWLYHV WR GR WKHLUKRPHZRUN  Yet 
transparency should be emphasized.  Much of the losses 
occurring in the housing finance markets can be attributed to a 
lack of information on the part of investors and mortgagors, 
either because the information was not offered or provided, or 
because it was too difficult to obtain.  While the recent 
experiences by investors and mortgagors should prompt more 
 
UHVWDUWLQJWKHOHQGLQJSURFHVVµId. at 3. 
139. There has been a debate about whether an implicit guarantee by 
WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW RI WKH *6(V· GHEWV HQFRXUDJHG RU DW OHDVW
facilitated, excessive risk-­taking.  See generally David Reiss, The Federal 
*RYHUQPHQW·V ,PSOLHG *XDUDQWHH RI )DQQLH 0DH DQG )UHGGLH 0DF·V
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 46 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008).  If 
WKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRIWKH*6(V·EDODQFHVKHHWVGRHVQRWVHWWOHWKHLVVXHWKHQLW
is doubtful that anything will.  Indeed, that guarantee has become explicit. 
140. See A Primer on the Secondary Mortgage Market, 2008 OFFICE FED. 
HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, MORTGAGE MARKET NOTE pt. 3, at 2, available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1242/MMNOTE083.pdf. 
141. See generally POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 67.  On December 3, 
2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted to adopt rules designed 
to bolster oversight of credit rating agencies.  See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
([FK&RPP·Q 6(&$SSURYHV0HDVXUHV WR 6WUHQJWKHQ2YHUVLJKW RI &UHGLW
Rating Agencies (Dec. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-­284.htm.  The new rules aimed to 
improve disclosure, reporting, and recordkeeping practices of the nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations in order to reduce conflicts of 
interest at these entities and to promote competition within the industry.  Id.  
In particular, the new rules would require disclosure of the ratings history for 
all issuer-­paid ratings.  Id. 
142. Hahn & Passel, supra note 113, at 3. 
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vigilance, transparency by the lenders and agents will achieve 
important efficiency goals in financial markets, particularly 
considering that the information needed to make wise decisions 
changes rapidly in our complex markets. 
Lenders should be required to adjust their capital cushions 
to reflect their risks in falling markets.  The task of measuring 
such risks in a world in which every major lender depends on 
every other major lender to honor financial contracts is truly 
daunting.  One must wonder whether more regulation here 
would drive lenders from the high-­risk credit on which cutting-­
edge businesses depend. 
 
C. Avoiding the Moral Hazard 
 
Was it just shortsightedness that contributed to the 
current market failure?  Was it willfulness³or just greed?  
Was it the larceny in the human heart?  Who is to blame for all 
the mispricing and poor results?  Individual responsibility is 
not absolute.  Behavioral economists have demonstrated that 
humans are powerfully and unwittingly influenced and co-­
opted by prevailing ideas and assumptions.143  We are unable 
to resist the enticement of something for free³such as 
mortgage loans that are provided without documentation of 
income, and which require no down-­payments. 
Shortsightedness can be responded to in some measure by 
requiring more stringent underwriting standards by lenders, 
greater disclosure to investors, increased transparency by 
ratings agencies, and stricter and more prudent accounting by 
the issuers.  But how to respond to willfulness and greed?  
Removing the opportunities for acting out on temptations for 
ill-­gotten gains, such as by mandating capital requirements 
and banning the use of off-­balance sheet vehicles, and 
adherence to Basel Standards144 would be the first thoughts.  
 
143. See generally John Gowdy & Irmi Seidl, Economic Man and Selfish 
Genes: The Implications of Group Selection For Economic Valuation and 
Policy, 33 J. SOCIO-­ECON. 343 (2004). 
144. The Basel Committee is a consortium of international banking 
representatives who analyze and provide recommendations and guidelines on 
a wide variety of financial issues.  See %DQNIRU,QW·O6HWWOHPHQWV+LVWory of 
the Basel Committee and Its Membership, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
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But, if we operate on the premise that evil lurks within us all, 
then sterner measures may be in order, such as stiff civil and 
criminal penalties for violating accounting standards, for 
nondisclosure, and for misrepresentations. 
In the meantime, how can newly-­rescued borrowers be 
convinced to be more watchful in the future?  How can others 
be made to heed the rashness of those who faced ruin before?  
How can the experiences of Long-­Term Capital Management145 
become instructive so as to prompt an attitude of prudence, as 
opposed to one that is cavalier, on the belief that their unsound 
loans would be made good by the Federal Government?  
Perhaps the key to avoiding or minimizing the moral hazard is 
to restrict intervention to truly exceptional circumstances.  
Assistance should perhaps be limited to aiding those at risk of 
losing their homes, but it should not enable overreaching 
lenders to avoid the loss of their vacation homes.146  But 
separating out the bad from the stupid is no easy task.  FDIC 
&KDLUPDQ 6KHLOD %DLU EHOLHYHV WKDW D ´FRPSOH[ LQWHUSOD\ RI
risky behavior by lenders, borrowers, and investors led to the 
FXUUHQWILQDQFLDOVWRUPµ147  ,QIDFWVKHVWDWHGWKDW´WKHOHQGLQJ
practices that are causing problems today were driven by 
 
145. In 1998, the hedge fund Long-­Term Capital Management was on 
the brink of collapse, standing to lose $100 billion.  See FERGUSON, supra note 
9, at 323-­27.  The Fund had been managed by finance quants who had made 
many unsound, esoteric bets, including investments in interest-­rate 
derivatives.  Id. at 323-­  5XVVLD·V LQDELOLW\ WR SD\ LWV GHEWV VHQW JOREDO
markets into turmoil and put the fund, which was saddled with high-­leverage 
and off-­balance sheet obligations, near collapse.  See id. at 328.  Because the 
fund owed large sums to banks and other financial institutions, its collapse 
could have meant ruin for these investors.  See id. at 327.  The Federal 
Reserve thus intervened by putting together a consortium of companies to 
buy it out and cover its debts.  Id.  While all the shareholders of the fund 
were wiped out, the creditors were protected.  Ten years later, Lehman 
Brothers was allowed to fail by the Federal Reserve.  See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  Its debts have been estimated to exceed $600 billion.  See 
supra note 93. 
146. Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
Lehman Brothers, who tried to blame everyone else for the market collapse, 
recently sold his $13 million mansion in Florida to his wife for $10.00.  Clyde 
Haberman, Imparting Some Shame to Those Who Trade in Greed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A25. 
147. Sheila Bair, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks Before the Consumer 
Federation of America (Dec. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spdec0408_2
.html. 
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desire for market share and revenue growth . . . pure and 
VLPSOHµ148 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The fault lies not in securitization, but in ourselves³in our 
abuses, carelessness, and cupidity.  While securitization 
achieves definite efficient goals³such as dividing up and 
VSUHDGLQJ ULVN VXLWDEOH WR LQYHVWRUV· YDU\LQJ REMHFWLYHs and 
levels of risk adversity, and by reducing the equity capital 
needed by intermediaries to absorb the risk of the assets being 
intermediated³it remains to consider whether the risks 
created by a process that operates without limits and 
transparency are greater than the risks it purports to allocate 
in the first place. 
 
 
148. Id. 
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